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ENERGY: PROSPECTS AND POLICY ISSUES 
IN INTRA-CMEA RELATIONS 
Witold Trzeciakowski 
This paper presents an exploratory review of publications 
dealing with past trends and projections concerned with energy 
in intra-CMEA relations. 
The research should be useful in the identification of 
directions for IIASA's research on "Mineral Markets and Trade". 
I hope that the collection of materials presented here may also 
be looked upon as the first stage of a study of energy-related 
issues in intra-CMEA relations. 
Due to the strict time-limit imposed on this work, it was 
not possible to review all of the non-CMEA publications listed in 
the bibliography. However, the main weakness of this research 
lies in the lack of information from CMEA countries. This could 
possibly be overcome by collaborating directly with institutes 
in CMEA countries. Without this information, this review should 
be regarded as an incomplete working draft. 
* 
I. Assessment of CMEA and World Reserves of Basic Fuel Minerals 
Table 1-1. The Structure of Petroleum Reserves and Their 
Exploitation (January 1, 1978). Source: Oil and Gas Journal, 
Dec. 26/77. 
Region Estimated Estimated Reserves/Produc- 
Reserves Production tion Ratio 
1977 
Billions of Billions of 
barrels barrels 
US and Canada 35.50 3.51 10.1 
Central and 
South America 40.37 
Europe (excl . 
CmA) 26.8 
Africa 59.20 
Middle East 366.17 7.98 45.9 
Asia-Pacific 
(excl. China) 19.75 
Cnina 20.00 0.66 30.3 
Other CMEA 3.00 0.15 20.0 
Total World 645.85 21.73 29.7 
Table 1-1: The Structure of Petroleum Reserves and their exploi- 
tation (Januaryl, 1978). Source: Oil and Gas Journal, Dec. 26/77 
* 
Under reserves are meant identified deposits of minerals 
known to be recoverable with current technology under present 
economic conditions. 
Table 1-2: The S t r u c t u r e  o f  World N a t u r a l  G a s  R e s e r v e s  
( January ,  1 ,  1 9 7 8 ) .  Source :  O i l  and  G a s  J o u r n a l ,  D e c .  26/77 
Region 
US and  Canada 
C e n t r a l  and  S o u t h  America 
Europe ( e x c l .  CMEA) 
A f r i c a  
Middle E a s t  
A s i a - P a c i f i c  ( e x c l .  China  
USSR 
China  
o t h e r  CMEA 
T o t a l  World 
E s t i m a t e d  R e s e r v e s  
b i l l i o n s  o f  c u b i c  f e e t  
T a b l e  1-3: The S t r u c t u r e  o f  T o t a l  World S o l i d  F u e l  R e s e r v e s .  
Source :  World Energy C o n f e r e n c e ,  Survey  o f  Energy Resources ,  1976. 
Region 
Af r ica 
A s i a  
Europe 
USSR and  CMEA 
Nor th  America 
S o u t h  America 
Oceania  
R e s e r v e s  Energy C o n t e n t  
b i l l i o n s  o f  q u a d r i l l i o n  Btu 
s h o r t  t o n s  
T o t a l  786 15.572 
A s  c a n  be s e e n  from tables  1-1,  1-2 a n d  1-3 t h e  CMEA d i s -  
p o s e s  o f  s u b s t a n t i a l  r e s e r v e s  i n  f u e l  m i n e r a l s .  However, t h e  
r a t i o  o f  e s t i m a t e d  r e s e r v e s  t o  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  o i l  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  
d a n g e r  o f  d e p l e t i o n  and  t h e  impor tance  o f  changes  o f  t h e  s t r u c -  
t u r e  o f  f u t u r e  e n e r g y  consumpt ion  ( t h e r e  i s  a s t r o n g  p o t e n t i a l  
f o r  f u e l  s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n ) .  
11. Past Trends in Energy Consumption--NMP (Net Material Product) 
In order to relate energy consumption with NMP, let us 
start with the ordering of average annual growth rates in the 
consecutive five-year plan periods: 
Table 11. Column 1: Total Energy Consumption (Average Annual 
Growth Rates. Source: UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, World Energy Supplies (ST/STAT/SER.J). 
Column 2: Average Annual Growth Rates in NMP of 
CMEA- 6. * 
Column 3. Coefficients of Energy Elasticities. Cal- 
culated as the ratio of the rate of energy consump- 
tion growth (Column 1) to the NMP growth (Column 2) 
respectively. 
1961-65 1966-70 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Bulgaria 15.8 6.6 2.4 9.7 8.6 1.1 
Czechoslovakia 4.7 1.8 2.6 3.0 7.1 0.4 
GDR 3.0 3.5 0.9 2.3 5.4 0.4 
Hungary 6.8 4.1 1.7 3.7 6.8 0.5 
Poland 3.8 6.1 0.6 4.7 5.9 0.8 
Romania 10.1 8.9 1.1 9.0 7.7 1.2 
* 
Under CMEA-6 are understood Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Romania. CMEA-countries encompass 
CMEA-6 plus the USSR. Members of CMEA outside Europe are ex- 
cluded from the analysis. 
A s  c a n  be  s e e n  t h e  r a t e s  o f  g r o w t h  o f  e n e r g y  consumpt ion  d e -  
c r e a s e  i n  c o n s e c u t i v e  p l a n  p e r i o d s .  Y e t  t h e  r a t e s  o f  g r o w t h  
were h i g h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  o f  e n e r g y  consumpt ion .  A s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  
e l a s t i c i t y  c o e f f i c i e n t s  f e l l  be low u n i t y .  T h i s  c a n  be  i o o k e d  
upon a s  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  t n a t  e n e r g y  r e s o u r c e s  were u t i l i z e d  more 
e f f i c i e n t l y .  The main r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  p o s i t i v e  t r e n d  i s  t h e  
c h a n g i n g  s t r u c t u r e  o f  e n e r g y  consumpt ion .  
1 I I . P a t t e r n  o f  Consumption o f  M i n e r a l  R e s o u r c e s  o n  CMEA-6 M a r k e t s  
The S t r u c t u r e  of Energy  Consumption.  
It  i s  w e l l  known t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  l i q u i d  f u e l  and  g a s  i s  more 
e f f e c t i v e  t h a n  t h e  u s e  o f  s o l i d  f u e l s .  I n  f a c t ,  i n  a l l  CMEA-6 
c o u n t r i e s  t h e r e  o c c u r r e d  a  marked r i s i n g  s h a r e  o f  l i q u i d  f u e l s  
a n d  g a s  consumpt ion  i n  t i m e .  T h i s  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  f o l l o w -  
i n g  s t a t i s t i c s .  
Table 111-1: Structure of Energy Consumption in CMEA-6 (1961-78, 
in million metric tons of coal equivalent). Source: Derived 
from the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs. World Energy Supplies (ST/STAT/SER.J), various years. 
Compiled by J.B. Hannigan and C.M. McMillan, Report No. 18, 
Institute of Soviet and East European Countries, Ottawa, 1981. 
Tota l  S o l i d  Fuel8 
2 Liquid Fuels and Gas 3 
Year ~ n a r g y '  Vol- a8 % of To ta l  Volume a s  t of To ta l  
-
Bulgar ia  1961 11.9 9.8 82.4% 1.8 1 5  .I.% 
1965 21.1 15.6 73.9% 5.2 24.6% 
1970 34.1 20.9 61.3% 12.9 37.8% 
19 75 40.9 20.6 50.4% 19.3 47.2% 
1978 44.2 19.0 43.1% 23.7 53.6% 
E-gary 
Poland 
Eastarn  Europe 1961 309.3 271.0 87.4% 38.0 12.3% 
1965 370.3 306.2 82.7% 62.9 17.0% 
19 70 456.1 338.5 74.2% U 5 . 3  25.3% 
1975 538.7 352.4 65.4% 182.3 33.8% 
1978 597.9 380.4 63.6% 212.1 35.5% 
I Comprises consumption of solid fuels, natural gas and hydro/ 
nuclear electricity. 
CI L Anthracite, bituminous coal, lignite and brown coal. 
3~ncludes liguef ied petroleum gases, gasolenes, kerosenes, 
jet fuels, fuel oil, refinery gas, and all natural and manufac- 
tured gas. 
The Absolute Level of Energy Consumption. 
I n  s p i t e  of t h e  improving t r e n d  i n  e f f i c i e n c y ,  s t i l l  i t s  
a b s o l u t e  l e v e l  was low, a s  t h e  s h a r e  of l i q u i d  f u e l s  and gas  i n  
t o t a l  energy consumption reached by CMEA-6 c o u n t r i e s ,  was much 
lower t han  t h a t  s h a r e  i n  t h e  world. ( I n  t h e  mid-sevent ies  around 
1/3 i n  CMEA-6, a s  a g a i n s t  more than  60% i n  t h e  world . )  The 
a b s o l u t e  l e v e l  of energy consumption p e r  $1 GNP i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  
i n  Table 1 1 1 - 2 .  
Table 111-2: Energy Consumption (1978) .  Source: R.A. Watson, 
The Linkage Between Energy and Growth P rospec t s  i n  Eas t e rn  Europe, 
1981 ( t i m e  pe r iod  1968-1978). 
Country p e r  c z p i t a  y e r  1s X1? 
i n  k g / c c a i  ir, k ~ / c o a l  
e q u i v a l e n t  e q l ~ i v a l  en t 
-------------------------------------------------- 
5~1~ziri-3. 5.020 
Czecho s l c v a k i a  7.531 
The comparative analysis of ZeveZs of energy used per $1 GDP shows t h a t  
t h e  corresponding f i g u r e s  f o r  reg ion  I1 (CMEA) were much h ighe r  
* 
t han  t h o s e  f o r  reg ion  I (US) and I11 ( O E C D ) .  
* 
Energy i n  a  F i n i t e  World, Execut ive  Report 4 ,  IIASA, Laxen- 
burg,  A u s t r i a ,  October 1981, p.  35. 
Projected 
.M Year 
F i g u r e  1 .  F i n a l  Energy p e r  u n i t  o f  Gross  Domestic P roduc t  
T h i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t  l a r g e  p o t e n t i a l  r e s e r v e s  i n  
CMEA c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  growth o f  e f f i c i e n c y ,  p rov ided  t h e  s t r u c -  
t u r e  o f  ene rgy  consumption c o u l d  be  f u r t h e r  improved. 
IV. The S t r u c t u r a l  Dependence o f  CMEA-6 Market on O i l  and Gas 
D e l i v e r i e s  from t h e  USSR 
The dependence o f  i n d i v i d u a l  CMEA-6 c o u n t r i e s  on energy  i n  
g l o b a l  terms may b e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  " s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y "  
i n d i c a t o r  ( f i g u r e s  f o r  1 978) : 
Poland 
Romania 
Czechoslovakia  
GDR 
Hungary 
B u l g a r i a  
The main s u p p o r t e r  o f  ene rgy  i s  t h e  USSR. 
In order to cover the rising demand for oil and gas the 
CMEA-6 concluded several long-term bilateral and multilateral 
agreements with the USSR. Statistical data show the very high 
dependence on Soviet supplies of oil and gas. In 1979 the share 
of-CLtIEA-6 crude oil imports from the USSR as a percentage of 
total oil imports amounted to 90%, and that of gas to 97% (ex- 
cluding Romania). 
In terms of overall CMEA-6 (excluding Romania) oil and gas 
imports from the USSR as a percentage of total energy consumption 
there occurred a steady rise in dependence: from 5.6% to 27% 
* (see Table IV). It is also interesting to note that the value 
of imports of Soviet oil and gas as a percentage of value of 
total imports from the USSR rose from 10.6% in the early '60s to 
34.3% in 1979. 
The dependence on Soviet supplies of oil and gas looks 
differently from country to country. Romania is excluded from 
the statistics, as it did not import oil and gas from the USSR 
until 1979. The main differences occur in the share of oil and 
gas imported from the USSR as a percentage of total energy 
consumption. Individual statistics by country are presented 
Table IV. 
* 
Table IV, as well as the disaggregated tables by country 
were compiled by J.B. Hannigan and C.M. McMillan in Research 
Report, No. 18, Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, 
Carleton University, Ottawa, 1981. 
Table IV. Volume and Value of CMEA-6 and Individual Countries' Imports of Soviet Oil and Gas: 
19t i1-1980 (excluding Romania). Source: Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik Stran-Chlenov Soveta 
Ekonomicheskoi Vzaimopomoshchi, Moskva: Statistika, various years; Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSR: 
Statisticheskii Sbornik, Moskva: Statistika, various years; United Nations, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, World Energy Supplies (ST/STAT/SER.J), New York, various years; 
and dational Foreign Assessment Center, International Energy Statistical Review, Washington, DC. 
CMEA- 6 
Crsic o i l  Crude ti1 N ~ t u r a l  gar Gas importe US.SR crude 
i- -or:.s ic:?orts ikpor tu  from frcrffi tlie o i l  and gaa 
f : < - I  t h 2  f1c3: t h e  the I !SSX USSR ne a 2 importe ae 
rs::{ cs+x a s  n ( d n . c u b i c  of t o t n l  a  X of t o t a l  
i l 'OOtxtrlc % of t o t a l  mct r t s )  sae imports energy con- 
CUBS) c r ~ t d r  011 sunption 
Y:?Jc 
-- - - \ - -  I c m r t a
1:5:-fij I ! 7 JO 952 312 n.a. 5.6% 
; ' S j - 7 3  2 ; 5 7 9  957: 1586 n.8. 11.7$: 
V0I.W 
Value of  importe Valuo of importe Value o f  i:.p?rts of 
of Soviet  o i l  of  Soviet  p s  Sovict  o i l  and g . 1 ~  
( inc lud ing  o i l  as a 2 of v t . 1 ~ ~  of 
products) t o t a l  i r p o r t s  from 
the  USSR I 
2 
0 
1 
341.9 2.2 10.6': 
514.1 21.4 11.52 
I VALUZ ( i n  ml l l ions  of rub les )  


V. Specific Features of the Intra-CMEA Fuel Mineral Market 
1) General Features of Intra CMEA Trade: 
- The volume and commodity structure of trade is determined 
bilaterally or multilaterally in intergovernmental 
treaties. 
- Long-term development strategies are coordinated multi- 
laterally or bilaterally within the framework of the 
S.C. "Long-term Target Programme in Energy, Fuels and 
Raw Materials". 
- Within these strategic "Long-term Target Programmes" five- 
year plans are discussed at the level of central planning 
bodies, and each yearly intergovernmental trade protocol 
determines in volume or value terms the specific mutual 
deliveries. 
- CMEA currencies are inconvertible, hence trade is supposed 
to be--as a rule--balanced bilaterally. The appearance 
of a trade surplus is tantamount to granting a credit. 
Considering the very low level of interest rates charged 
(2%) a trade surplus amounts to subsidization. 
- Within the overall balance there occurs a tendency to 
balance separately "hard commodities" (i.e., commodities 
that can effectively be sold for hard currency, e.g., 
"hard" oil for "hard" coal). The final structure of trade 
is the result of an intergovernmental matched sale bar- 
gaining process, Whereas trade with market economies 
consists in independent and separate decision-making 
in individual export transactions or import transactions, 
CMEA trade is characterized by matched sale treaties 
and matched sale transactions. 
- Prices in intra-CMEA trade are based on world prices. 
Till 1976, these CMEA prices were fixed on the basis of 
each former five-year plan period for the entire next 
five-year period. 
- pricing rules are determined multilaterally on CMEA 
Council sessions. Specific prices are negotiated bi- 
laterally independently to negotiations determining the 
volumes and commodity structure or trade. These specific 
prices are not CMEA equilibrium prices. 
As fuel minerals are "hard commodities" and machinery and 
industrial goods are usually "soft commodities", and as hard 
commodities are underpriced (due to the five-year average pric- 
ing), all the energy importing countries (CMEA-6) are vitally 
interested in getting as much fuel minerals from the USSR as 
possible because their industrial exports are not easily salable 
on western markets. As a result, there exists a steady pressure 
on the USSR to increase supplies in fuel minerals to CMEA-6 
countries. 
2) Pricing Marginal Costs and World Prices of Fuel Minerals: 
In the period 1971-75, oil production in the USSR increased 
* 
by 421, whereas oil reserves grew by 30%. The continuation of 
these trends might lead to a relative depletion of oil reserves. 
Increased demand of CMEA countries for oil and gas had to be 
met from new sources located in remote regions east of the Urals, 
in the Caspian lowlands, or in Arctic areas. In order to in- 
crease productive capacities in distant regions, new large in- 
vestments were required. The development of the West Siberian 
energy complex has been one of the largest capital investment 
outlay of the Soviet 1971-75 plan. Investments were needed not 
only to increase the exploitation of the fields, but also for 
infrastructural needs and for the development of transportation 
networks. All these developments were connected with rising 
marginal costs of exploitation and transportation, as well as 
with heavy hard currency imports of western equipment. Parallel 
to these rising marginal costs there occurred a quadrupling of 
world oil prices in 1973-74. 
Under these conditions, the main fuel mineral suppliers ob- 
jected to bearing the burden of increasing productive capacities 
on old terms. They stressed the necessity to eliminate implied 
subsidizing in terms of: 
- opportunity costs measured in rising marginal costs and 
in rising world energy prices; 
* 
Melnikov, N. and Shelest, V., Toplivno-Energeticheskii 
Kompleks SSSR, Planovoe Khoziaistvo, No. 2, 1975. 
- carrying new investments outlays exclusively by the 
producer. 
Hence, in the course of multilateral negotiations a new set 
of pricing rules has been mutually agreed upon and a new pattern 
of exploitation of minerals has been accepted in the form of 
"joint investments". 
3 CMEA Pricing Problems: 
As already mentioned, previously intra-CMEA prices were 
fixed on the basis of each former five-year plan period for the 
entire next five-year period. These rules of price formation 
were supposed to eliminate the short-term speculative price 
movements and to facilitate decision-making in more stable 
external conditions. During the sixties, as long as world price 
trends were, by and large, relatively stable, these CMEA pric- 
ing rules worked fairly well and created a favourable framework 
for international coordination of CMEA cooperation. However, in 
conditions of external abrupt changes of world prices, especially 
those of energy, the old CMEA pricing rules failed to reflect 
the opportunity costs of rapidly rising fuel minerals suppliers. 
In order to eliminate price discrepancies, one should 
accept current world prices as the basis of CMEA pricing. This 
solution, however, would introduce the principle of full flexi- 
bility of prices, which would be hardly compatible with strategic 
planning. Besides, it would result in a drastic abrupt change 
in the terms of trade in favour of the Soviet Union. In the 
course of multilateral negotiations new pricing rules have been 
formulated as a result of a compromise: since 1976, intra-CMEA 
prices were determined as a moving five-year average of world 
market prices and changed annually. 
As usually in a compromise solution no one was fully satisfied: 
- the producers complained that the new pricing rules did 
not eliminate the implied subsidization of the importing 
countries; they argued that these rules were not promot- 
ing exports to CMEA-member countries; 
- the importers complained about the deterioration of their 
terms of trade and argued that annual modification of 
prices were damaging the stability of long-term plan- 
ning and were introducing elements of short-term 
speculation. 
In fact, the modified prices of fuel minerals for CMEA 
partners remained below world prices. To illustrate the point, 
examples of the Polish-Soviet trade prices in fuel minerals ex- 
ports and imports are listed below. 
Table V. Difference in Fuel Prices. 
* 
Prices in zld per ton 
1 9 7 6  1 9 7 7  1 9 7 8  1 9 7 9  1 9 8 0  
Polish imuorts: 
Crude oil: CMEA 1 7 3  2 1 4  2 6 6  2 9 7  31  8  
Crude oil: world 3 1 6  3 3 4  3 3 9  4 5 2  7 3 4  
Fuel oil: CMEA 2 2 5  2 8 2  3 4 3  3 6 0  471  
Fuel oil: world 3 6 7  4 0 5  423  9 8 8  9 6 8  
Polish exports: 
Coke: CMEA 22  1  2 2 3  2 5 5  2 6 3  253  
Coke: world 2 5 7  2 8 5  2 9 4  3 1 3  4 0 1  
* US $1=3 zld (devisa zloties) 
Of course, in order to assess foreign trade profitability 
it is not enough to compare CMEA prices with world prices in 
exports, but equally in imports. This comparison must be done 
for all commodities within the general framework of a yearly 
trade agreement. Each partner then compares eventual "losses" 
in exports with eventual "gains" in imports. These comparisons 
are justified as long as they concern "hard commodities" (like 
fuel minerals). Eowever, tiley are questionable if one compares 
world prices with CMEA prices for "soft commodities", as selling 
* 
them on hard currency markets may be a fictitious alternative. 
In spite of the existence of "implied subsidies" in CMEA 
pricing, the overall terms of trade changed drastically in 
favour of the fuel minerals exporters, as energy prices increased 
markedly under the new pricing rules, though with delay in com- 
parison with current world prices. As a result, the USSR, as 
the main fuel mineral exporter granted long-term credits to the 
CMEA partners mostly affected by unfavourable terms of trade 
changes. 
The choice of the actually functioning CMEA pricing variant 
has been influenced by pragmatic considerations, namely, the 
feasibility of world prices as an objective point of reference, 
the need to reach a compromise between the interests of the 
producers and the users, as well as the attempt to ensure some 
continuity with the former pricing rules. However, this choice 
has important consequences for the terms-of-trade effects on the 
balance of payments. 
The theoretical discussions on CMEA pricing principles are 
still going on and are closely interconnected with basic policy 
issues. Should the pricing rules be derived from a CMEA optimi- 
zation model, thus reflecting marginal cost, scarcity rents, 
* *  
CMEA constraints and world trade alternatives? Or should one 
* 
To illustrate the point: The overall analysis of 1 6  com- 
modity groups in Polish imports and 8 commodity groups in Polish 
exports resulted in a Soviet "implied subsidy" of the order of 
US $7-8 billion in the plan period 1976 -80 .  However, the analy- 
sis was based solely onraw materials, where the comparison of 
CMLA prices with world prices is fully justified. Other pro- 
cessed goods were not analysed, as the assumption that they are 
saleable at world market prices would be questionable and world 
prices would be difficult to determine due to quality differences. 
* *  
Optimization models of CMEA trade have been analysed by 
eastern economists in the USSR (J. Shagalov), Lungary f ~ 4 .  Tardos), 
and Poland (J. Mycielski, W. Piaszczynski) . 
accept the world prices, as the determinant for CMEA pricing? 
If so, which variant should be applied: the static and stable 
approach based on past five-year averages, the intermediary-- 
based on a moving average, or the approach based on current 
world prices? The direction of future evolution remains to be 
seen. Whatever the choice will be, it will directly affect the 
structure of trade in fuel minerals. 
4 )  Joint CMEA Investment Projects and Investment Coordination: 
As already stated, rising CMEA-6 needs required massive 
investments in the field of fuel minerals exploitation and in 
the construction of necessary infrastructure (transportation 
network, housing, etc.). Eence, in order to get additional 
supplies of fuel minerals CMEA-6 were supposed to participate in 
investment expenditures: either by undertaking investment out- 
lays on their own territory, or by supplying capital equipment, 
necessary materials and labour for investments on the producer's 
territory on credit terms. These credits were supposed to be re- 
paid by future counter-deliveries of fuel minerals supplied by 
newly created productive capacities. A special CMEA Inter- 
national Investment bank was established to finance joint invest- 
ment projects. in fuel minerals and other new materials. 
Below are examples of international CMEA coordination and 
construction of joint investments: 
- oil pipeline1 "Druzhba" connecting the fields in the Ural 
region with Eastern Europe. Constructed in 1958-1963. 
Each participating country was constructing the segment 
of the pipeline on its own territory (the USSR 3,000 
km, Poland 675 km, the GDR 27 km, Czechoslovakia 836 km, 
and Hungary 12 3 km) ; 
- the extension of the "Druzhba" oil pipeline from 
Almat'evsk to Mozyr and to Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
(1 968-1 970) ; 
- oil pipeline from Polotsk to Mozejki constructed by 
Poland in 1978-1979 for counter deliveries of 800,000 
* 
tons of oil annually for twenty years; 
- natural gas pipeline from Ukraine to Silesia--deliveries 
to Poland (1 966) ; 
- natural gas pipeline "Bratstvo" from Ukraine to Czecho- 
slovakia (1967) ; 
- natural gas pipeline from Ukraine to Bulgaria (1969); 
- natural gas pipeline from Ukraine to the GDR (extension 
in 1970 of the pipeline to Czechoslovakia); 
- natural gas pipeline "Soyuz" from Orenburg to Eastern 
Europe (1979-1978), delivering 15.5 billion cubic metres 
per year for twenty years (1980-2000); 
- the multilateral specialization agreement in the produc- 
tion of equipment for nuclear power plants; 
- joint investment in the 4000-megawatt Khmelnitskii 
nuclear power plant in Ukraine (1979) with the partici- 
pation of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland; 
- joint investment in the construction of high tension 
transmission line "Mir" (1 975-79) from Vinnitsa in 
Ukraine to Albertirsa in Hungary, connected with the 
USSR's "Edinyi" power system; 
- joint construction of a 750 kilovolt line from 
* *  
Khmelnitskii to Rzeszow in Poland. 
5) Imports from Non-CMEA Sources: 
In view of the rising costs of additional supplies of Soviet 
fuel minerals CMEA-6 countries have undertaken the initiative to 
develop imports of oil and gas from other sources. 
Before the sharp oil world price increases OPEC countries 
were willing to trade with the CMEA countries on the basis of 
barter agreements, exchanging oil for machinery and equipment. 
As it comes out from Table IV-1, CMEA-6 (excluding Romania) im- 
ported in 1972-73 13% of the total import of oil from non-Soviet 
sources. In the period 1971-79, imports of oil from OPEC 
* 
Petroleum Economist, March 1979. 
* 
Savenko and Samkov (1 980) . 
countries (including Romania) increased frorn.US$.i351 million to 
US$ 2,040 million (Romania's share amounted to half of it). 
In 1979, Romania imported 14 million tons of oil from OPEC 
countries. Poland concluded a long-term agreement with British 
Petroleum for the construction of an oil refinery and steady 
deliveries of 3 million tons of oil for this refinery. Poland's 
purchases of oil from non-Soviet sources were supposed to in- 
crease so as to cover the rising domestic demand in the early 
'80s (5 million tons of oil annually were envisaged). 
Czechoslovakia concluded in the mid-seventies an agreement 
with Iran to buy 3.6 million cubic metres of natural gas 
annually. Czechoslovakia and Hungary attempted to increase im- 
ports from the Middle East of the order of 10 million tons 
annually by constructing the Adria pipeline in the late '70s. 
However, the expansion of non-Soviet purchases was signif- 
icantly constrained by: 
- the consecutive sharp rises in oil world prices--in 1980 
the cost of oil imported from OPEC countries as a per- 
centage of CMEA-6 exports to the hard currency area 
amounted to 24%; 
- unfavourable political developments--the revolution in 
Iran resulted in the cancellation of oil barter agree- 
ments with CMEA countries, and the Iraq-Iran war also 
cut back the hard currency deliveries from these markets. 
Since 1980, Romania started importing oil from the USSR. 
Poland was unable to afford the continuation of hard currency 
oil purchases. Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in spite of the 
completion of the Adria pipeline were not able to use it, be- 
cause they could not afford to pay current oil prices in hard 
currency. 
Summing up, in spite of the increasing demand for additional 
oil, the use of outside CMEA sources supply is constrained by 
the low capacity to earn hard currency through industrial ex- 
ports and by the rising indebtedness. In view of the insuffi- 
cient hard currency earnings CMEA-6 countries were unable to 
meet simultaneously the two burdens: 
- to service the huge hard currency debt, and 
- to afford hard currency expenditures for OPEC oil. 
Therefore, the future development of oil imports from OPEC 
depends to a large extent on the capacity of the CMEA-6 to 
service the hard currency debt. 
* 
As it is shown by some economists , CMU-6 countries were 
indebted very heavily in the West (hard currency area) and--to 
a smaller extent--in the USSR. 
As comes out from the statistics, there are no indebtedness 
problems only with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. How- 
ever, the remaining CMEA countries surpassed all the "admissible" 
limits of credit worthiness. There occurred an evident incom- 
patibility between the rising burden of debt servicing and the 
rising bill for hard currency imports of oil from OPEC markets. 
VI) Alternative Domestic Sources of Energy 
The discrepancy between rising needs on energy and limited 
supply possibilities forced CMEA-6 countries to restrict the 
previously planned increases in liquid fuel imports adapting 
their economies to structural changes in supplies, to reorient 
their policies towards the development of domestic resources of 
coal and nuclear energy, and to promote conservation policies. 
Firstly, there occurred a shift in the relative use of oil 
and gas. Over the period 1976-80, CMEA oil import from the USSR 
increased by 23% while imports of gas increased by 167%. Hence, 
the share of Soviet gas in CMEA-6 total energy consumption rose 
from 2.9% in 1975 to 6.9% in 1980, whereas the corresponding 
share in oil rose from 18.7% to 20.1%. (See Table IV-1.) 
* 
Polish Debt: A Game of Chicken, ~usiness Week, February 
16, 1381; G. Fink, An Assessment of European CMEA Countries Hard 
Currency Debt, September, 1981, Vienna, No. 72; some indications 
can be drawn from the yearbook "Vuesuyaya Torgoveye SSSR" and 
"Bulletin of Moscow Nazodny Bank". 
Secondly, there were heavy involvements in coal mines 
during the whole period. (See Table 111-1.) Poland relied 
heavily on coal and reached a coal production peak in 1979, then 
ran into difficulties and political unrests which resulted in a 
dramatic decline in the output and exports. 
Domestic production reached in 1979 202 million tons, in 
1980 195 million tons and in 1981, 163 million tons. Exports 
reached respectively 41 million tons, 31 million tons, and 
15 million tons. 
Romania expanded the coal production over the period 1970-79 
by 62%. Czechoslovakia expanded the coal production over the same 
period by 13%. In the remaining countries coal production was 
* 
stagnating or falling. 
Thirdly, the 32nd CMEA Council Session in 1978 placed 
heavy emphasis on the expansion of nuclear power. A joint 
investment has been undertaken: the construction of a 4000- 
megawatt Khmelnitskii nuclear power station, which will supply 
electricity to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Actually, 
in 1980 the installed nuclear power capacity expanded to about 
3,500 megawatts (Bulgaria 880 MW, Czechoslovakia 880 MW, and the 
**  
GDR 1760 MW). 
Fourth, CMEA countries adopted a policy of "rationalization 
and conservation measures" aimed at constraining the consumption 
***  
of fuels. All the CMEA countries agreed on a program of 
multilateral coordination of production location in chemicals 
* 
Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik Stron-Chlenov Soveta Ekonom- 
icheskoi Vzaimopomoshchi, Moskva, 1979, and Raport o sytuacji 
ekonomiiznej, Warsaw 1981. 
** 
Tiraspolsky (1980) p. 50. Shabad (1981). 
***  
Dobozi (1980) p. 29. 
within the general framework of the "Long-term Target Program 
Fuel, Energy and Raw Materials". Under this agreement there. is 
a tendency to locate' high energy-intensive chemicals in the USSR, 
and less energy-intensive projects in the remaining Ci.IEA-6 
countries. 
VII. Projects for the Future 
1. Projection of Overall Economic Development: 
(a) The official CMEA projection of economic development (1 980- 
85), published as materials of party congresses or publications 
* 
of five-year plans : 
B Czec. GDR hung Pol Rom USSR 
NMP 6.0 3.7 4.1 3.2 1.65 7.2 3.5 
b) Western estimates of CMEA growth by country (1981-90) : 
Some of the official projections are reassessed by western 
authors for the period 1981-90. The most recent publication 
estimates the following NMP rates of growth (1981-90) . 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
USSR 
Source: An Assessment of Zuropean CMEA CountriesEard Currency 
i)ei;t,.by G. Fink, Vienna Institute for ~omparativeEconomic 
Studies, September 1981. 
* 
Bulgaria, April 10, 1981 ; Czechoslovakia, April 16, 1981 ; 
GDR, April 15, 1981; Hungary, November 1980; Poland, October 
1980; Romania, August 1, 1981; USSR, November 20, 1981. 
c) IIASA long-term CMEA projections (1950-75-2000-2030): 
The marked slow down in the rates of growth of GDP,GNP or 
NMP is consistent with the long-term trend resulting from the 
IIASA projections for the developed regions, and also for CMEA 
countries (Region 11). 
GNP per head GNP projection by IIASA 
-- 
REGION II 
3.2% 
Figure 2. Source: W. Sassin, On Energy and Economic Development, 
IIASA, 1980. 
Present figures on the connecting lines give historical and 
projected rates of economic growth in terms of the annual growth 
in the gross national product per head for three different time 
intervals between 1950 and 2030. All the figures are average 
annual growth rates over the interval in question. Light coloured 
parts of bars show the difference between high and low growth 
scenarios. Note that the medium and long range projections in 
"The Global 2000 Report to the President" assume the following 
overall rates shown in Table VI-3. 
1976-1 985 1985-2000 
High Medium L o w .  High Medium Low 
OPEC 7.2 6.35 5.5 6.5 5.4 4.3 
Low income LDCs 4.4 3.6 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.5 
Medium income 
LDC s 6.6 5.55 4.5 4.9 4.4 3.9 
OECD 
CMEA 
China 
Table  VI-I: Real  GNP Growth Rate Assumptions (Compound annua l  % ) .  
Source:  The Global  2000 Report  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  Vol. 11, 
Table  X-1, US Government P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  Washington, 1980. 
2) Energy Balances  (1 985-1990-2000) 
a )  On t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e s e  GNP p r o j e c t i o n s  it was p o s s i b l e  t o  
c o n s t r u c t  t h e  fo l l owing  energy ba l ances  f o r  t h e  y e a r  1985 and 
1990. 
Regional  energy ba l ances  d i s p l a y  a  range  o f  p o s s i b l e  econo- 
mic outcomes, b u t  do n o t  i n c o r p o r a t e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  such a s  
t h o s e  concern ing  t h e  energy e x p o r t s  from t h e  c e n t r a l l y  planned 
economies. F o r e c a s t s  o f  t h e i r  u n c e r t a i n  r o l e  i n  t h e  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  market  between 1985 and 1990 range  from n e t  e x p o r t s  o f  
1 m i l l i o n  b a r r e l s  p e r  day t o  n e t  impor t s  o f  4-5 m i l l i o n  b a r r e l s  
p e r  day. 
b) The s t r u c t u r e  of  CMEA energy demand f o r  2000 i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  
i n  tke fo l lowing :  
Table  VI-2: Regional  Energy Balances .  Source:  The Globa l  2000 
Report  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  Vol. 11, Table  X - 4 ,  U S  Government 
P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  Washington, p. 167, 168,  1980. 
Industrial- Less Centrally 
izcd Developed Planned World 
Countriesa Countrir5 Co"n'ries Econonlies 
- 
- 
MEDIUM G N P  GROWTH 
Oil (rhouscrnd.~ bblldcry) 
production 
Imports 
Consumption 
s~tural  gas 
(b;//ions r ' r r  fr!\.r) 
production 
Imports 
Consumption 
Coal 
(millions slrorr rons!vrJ 
Production 
Imports 
Consumption 
Euclear, hydro, solar, geothermal 
(rernnsurt-hrlyr) 
Total energy consumption 
(quodrillio~r Brrr ) 
Oil 
(rhorrsonds bbllday) 
Production 
lmports 
Consumption 
Natural gas 
(billiurrs c'rr frlyr) 
Production 
Imports 
Consumption 
Coal 
(milliotis short rutlslyr) 
Production 
Imports 
Consumption 
Nuclear, hydro, solar. geothermal 
(rerahSnrr-hrlyr) 
Total energy consumption 
(qrr(rdril1ion Brrr ) 
Table VI-3. Source: The Global 2000 ..., op. cit., Table X-10, 
p. 173. 
CMEA Energy Demand Year 2000 
in quadrillion Btu 
Renewable Resources (hydro, geothermal, solar, biomass) 27 
Nuclear 26 
Oil 29 
Natural gas 37 
Coal 7 1 
Total 
Total world demand (including CMEA) 
As comes out from these projections, the share of coal in 
the overall energy demand is very high in CMEA countries. This 
leads to grave consequences in gaseous emissions. 
3 CMEA Trade Projections in Energy 
a) Soviet oil supplies to CMEA-6 pr~spects 1985: 
The differing assessments of the level of the production, 
consumption and export in the USSR in 1985 are illustrated by 
the following table, confronting the various projections. 
Table VI-6. Projected USSR Production, Consumption of Crude 
Oil and Export. Sources: Pravda, December 2, 1980; Simulations 
of Soviet Growth Options to 1985, National Foreign Assessment 79; 
D. Bond, Forecasting Energy and Fuel Requirements Within a System 
of Macroeconometric models, mimeo 1980; Economic Commission of 
Europe, 1981; J. Vanous. Eastern European and Soviet Fuel Trade 
1970-85, JEC July 1981. 
(base: 603 million tons in 1980) 
in mill. tons Offic. ECE/ OECD CIA SOVMOD J. Vanous 
plan UN 
Production 
Consumption - 552 525 464 4 9 1 449-508 
Export netto 168 100 3 6 83 56-1 42 
In light of the lacking official data on the level of ex- 
ports planned to CMEA-6 countries, one is left with the varying 
assessments of export totals as expected by various authors. 
The only reliable source of information is the speech by 
* 
Prime Minister Kosygin delivered at the 34th CMEA Council Ses- 
sion, stating that "the Soviet Union will deliver to CMEA coun- 
tries over the five-year plan period nearly 400 million tons of 
oil. 
This means that the USSR oil exports to CMEA-6 would remain 
more or less at 1980 levels (72.3-80 million tons). Consequently, 
this means that unless new joint investments are undertaken by 
CMEA-6 in the USSR, the increases in demand for energy must be 
covered by other than oil fuel-minerals, or by additional im- 
ports from non-Soviet sources. 
b) Gas prospects 1985: 
The official plan fixes the production of gas in the USSR 
** in 1985 at the level of 600-640 billion cubic metres , which 
means that the high rates of growth achieved in the former five- 
year plan are to be maintained (this would mean an increase from 
100 billion cubic meters during 1976-80 to 158 billion cubic 
metres during 1981-85 in Soviet supplies to CMEA-6). 
The crucial question is what proportion of the Soviet 
domestic production will effectively be devoted to CMEA-6 im- 
ports. In 1980 these imports amounted to 31.5 billion cubic 
metres, which was 7% of the actual total production of gas. 
The increase in domestic output should--first of all--cover 
the decline in Soviet imports of gas from Iran, amounting to 
10 billion cubic metres. Next, it should envisage the substitu- 
tion of gas for oil on the domestic market, as a consequence of 
constraints in oil production, and of the growth in domestic 
* 
Pravda, June 18, 1980. 
** 
Pravda, December 2 ,  1980. 
demand for energy. Further, the increase in domestic output 
would probably be devoted to ensuring gas deliveries to Western 
Europe within the negotiated "deal of the century", envisaging 
the deliveries at the level of 40-45 billion cubic metres by 1986. 
These factors determine the field of manoeuvre of CMEA-6 in 
their negotiations with the USSR for additional gas supplies. 
* 
Western experts see little chances for an essential increase 
in the Soviet exports of gas in comparison to the level of ex- 
ports reached in 1980. 
c) Nuclear energy and electricity prospects 1980: 
The "CMEA Target Program for Cooperation in Fuels, Energy 
* * 
and Raw Materials" set a target of 150,000 megawatts to be 
installed by 1990. Of this total. 37,000 megawatts should be 
* * *  installed in CMEA-6 countries. 
Besides the plans foresee deliveries of electricity from 
the Khmelnitskii nuclear power plant of the order of 20-24 bil- 
lion Kwh annually to CMEA-6. The implementation of the above 
targets requires massive investments by those countries. 
d) Coal prospects 1 985 : 
The short-term prospects for increasing coal exports from 
CMEA producers to CMEA consumers are rather grim. The production 
* *  * 
of coal in the USSR is stagnating. 
The production of coal in Poland is deteriorating. Polish 
coal production fell from 202 million tons in 1979 to 163 mil- 
lion tons in 1981; Polish total exports fell respectively from 
41 million tons to 15 million tons, and exports to CMEA fell 
from 20 million tons to 4 million tons in 1981. 
* 
J.B. Hannigan and C.M. McMillan, The Energy Factor in 
Soviet-East European Relations, Research Report, No. 18, East- 
West Commercial Relations Series, 1981, p. 41. 
* *  
Adopted at the 33rd CMEA Council Session, June 1979. 
* * *  
J.B. Hannigan and C.M. McMillan, op.cit., p. 42-43. 
In the long run, the coal reserves in the USSR and in 
Poland are very large (as already was stated in I). However, 
the increase in production is highly capital-intensive and highly 
air-polluting. 
e) Trade with OPEC in the light of indebtedness prospects: 
* 
According to forecasts made by J. Vanous the CMEA-6 im- 
port bill for oil from OPEC countries, amounting in 1980 US$6.5 
billion would increase in 1985 to US$ 20.6 billion. 
The crucial question arises, whether this mounting oil 
import burden is compatible with the burden of rising indebted- 
ness. 
Country Total Debt in $ Debt in $ 
Debt of revenue of exports 
Bulgaria 1980 4000 
19 85 5932 
Czecho- 1980 3800 
slovakia 1985 8859 
Hungary 1980 8400 
1985 17348 
Poland 1980 23000 
1985 331 70 
Romania 1980 7900 
1985 13976 
USSR 1980 7500 
1985 4593 
Table VI-4: Projection of CMEA Hard Currency Debt to 1985. 
Base Scenario. Source: G. Fink, op.cit., pp. 32-38. 
In the light of the above figures the debt burden will 
reach in 1985 the level of US$ 102.3 billion. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that with the exception of the 
USSR, the increase of CMEA-6 imports from OPEC are doubtful. It 
seems highly improbable that CMEA-6 would be able to afford 
devoting 1/4 to 1/3 of their total hard currency earnings to 
oil purchases in a situation in which debt servicing payments 
surpass any tolerable limits of creditworthiness. 
Increases in energy demand will lead to increases of the 
gaseous emissions generated in the course of energy use. The 
strategy based on a heavy use of coal--as is the case with CMEA 
countries--leads to heavy loadings of particulates, sulphur 
dioxide, oxides of nitrogen and carbon dioxide. The strongest 
impacts are likely to be those onurban air quality, increasing 
respiratory illnesses and damage to vegetation. In the longer 
run, accumulation of -atmospheric carbon dioxide may have more 
impact on the environment than all the other effects of energy 
use taken together. (See The Global 2000 ..., op.cit., Table X-16, 
p. 181. 
VIII. General Characteristics of the CMEA Fuel Minerals ivlarket 
Conclusions and Policy Issues 
- General characteristics of the CMEA fuel minerals market: 
The CMEA market in fuel minerals is state-controlled, inter- 
nationally coordinated, strictly planned and structured. Never- 
theless, it is a free market with economically sovereign agents 
(states), with unrestricted freedom of choice in the selection 
of suppliers, in the geographical allocation of exports and in 
the choice of investments. Yet, it is a market on which CMEA-6 
importing countries are highly dependent upon the USSR's supplies 
of fuel minerals. This economic dependence results mainly from 
the geographical endowment in energy resources and constrained 
possibilities of relying on hard currency sources of supply. 
These latter constraints are due to a low capacity to earn hard 
currency through industrial exports and to a rising hard cur- 
rency debt servicing burden in the 1980s. 
- Energy consumption is the prime mover of CMEA's economic 
development. Energy production is the decisive factor constrain- 
ing the rate of growth of CMEA countries. Parallel to other 
developed regions, CMEA rates of growth show a slowing down 
trend. * 
- CMEA as an economic integration--dispose of limited re- 
sources of oil, large reserves of natural gas, and very large 
reserves of land. 
2. Conclusions and Policy Issues 
- CMEA countries dispose of large reserves in energy efficiency 
improvements (in terms of final energy use per unit of GNP). 
Concerted policy measures aimed at saving energy may bring sub- 
stantial results at low costs. 
- Switching from abundant coal reserves to more efficient, if 
less abundant, oil and natural gas resources has led to economic 
gains in excess of the costs involved in setting up regional 
distribution systems for oil and gas. Whereas in 1961 liquid 
fuels and natural gas accounted for 12.3% of total energy con- 
sumption, by 1978 the equivalent share rose to 35.5%. A crucial 
question for the future is whether this traditional cost-mini- 
mizing strategy can be sustained. Due to an expected depletion 
of oil reserves, the acceptable growth scenarios will require 
heavy investments in gas exploitation and transportation net- 
works, and probably the introduction of coal liquefaction on a 
broader scale. This will require heavy capital outlays. 
* 
An interesting econometric analysis how to link energy 
with economic growth prospects of CMEA-6 has been undertaken 
by R.A. Watson. The differences in GNP rates of growth (those 
under the assumption that energy requirements are fully met, and 
those, under the assumption of possible energy constraints) are 
ranging (by country) from 0.2 to 2.8 points. 
R.A. Watson, The Linkage Between Energy and Growth Prospects in 
Eastern Europe", Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the US, 
1981. 
- The diversion of this much coal from electric power genera- 
tion to the conversion into synthetic fuels may in turn have to 
be partly compensated for by the further expansion of nuclear 
power. In the high long-term IIASA scenario for the CMEA-region 
for 2030 the share of nuclear power is 33% and that of coal is 
38%. A lower share of nuclear power and a similar share of coal 
is forecasted for 2000 in Table VI-3. Hence, the use of 
primary energy sources shifts gradually in the long-term projec- 
tions toward coal and nuclear power. 
- CMEA countries are facing a difficult transition not only 
from cheap fuels to expensive ones, but also from comparatively 
clean and easy to handle fossil fuels to dirty and less versatile 
ones. These prospects raise questions of ecological stability, 
air pollution, water requirements and climatic effects. 
- According to IIASA projections CMEA countries will not 
participate in the oil trade between regions. Oil exports from 
the USSR to CMEA-6 continue, and exports of coal and gas from 
the region as a whole expand. The level of this.expansion 
remains an open question. 
- Energy balances are putting severe limitations on economic 
growth of CMEA-6. 
- These countries are heavily dependent upon energy supplies 
from the USSR. The share of crude oil imported from the USSR 
as a percentage of total oil imports amounted in 1979 to 90%. 
The respective share of gas was 97%. Oil and gas imported from 
the USSR as a % of total energy consumption amounted in 1980 to 
27%. 
- CMEA-6 prospects to increase imports of liquid fuels from 
OPEC countries are constrained by the growing burden of hard 
currency indebtedness. 
- Imports of Soviet oil and gas have been for CMEA-6 cheaper 
than those from the hard currency area at world prices. However, 
the;:? exists a ceiling on these imports, constraining the fur- 
ther growth in energy consumption. 
- For CMEA-6 regional cooperation and joint investments in 
energy seem to be a feasible way in easing the fuel supply 
problems. 
3. Further research: Many questions remain open: 
What policies of fuel conservation should be followed? 
Should individual countries invest in the expansion of 
domestic extracting industries, or participate in CMEA 
joint investments? 
Which type of energy consumption should be promoted? 
How to apply intra-CMEA specialization criteria to invest- 
ment planning in individual countries? 
What pricing rules should be applied so as to rationalize 
intra-CMEA trade? 
How to assess the profitability of joint investments? 
How to assess the profitability of East-West cooperation 
agreements? 
What are the strategic potentialities in developing East- 
West trade and cooperation in the field of fuel minerals? 
How to compare the efficiency of trade with hard currency 
partners and trade with clearing markets? 
These exemplary problems need research. Some of these 
questions can be solved exclusively by research institutes of 
the respective countries. Some other questions could be analyzed 
jointly with an international institute. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Balkay, B., Energy Situation and Cooperation Within CMEA. 
Workshop on East-West European Economic Interaction: 
Prospects of European East-West cooperation in the field of 
energy. Vienna, April 8-12, 1979. 
Dienes, L. and Shahad, T., The Soviet Energy System: Resource 
Use and Policies. Washington, V.N. Winston, 1979. 
Dobozi, I., Policy Responses to the Energy Crisis: East and West. 
Paper presented at the Fifth US-Hungarian Economic Round 
Talk, May 7-9, 1980, Cambridge, Mass. 
Filanovskii, V., Zapadno-Sibirskii Neftegazovyi Kompleks: 
Rezultaty: Perspektivy, Planovoe Khoziaistuo, No.3, 
March 1980. 
Fink, G., An Assessment of European CMEA Countries' Hard Cur- 
rency Debt, Forschungsbericht No. 72, Vienna Institute for 
Comparative Economic Studies, Vienna 1981. 
The Global Report 2000 to the President, US Government Printing 
Office, Washington, 1980. 
Hannigan, J.B. and McMillan, C.M., Joint Investment in Resource 
Development: Sectoral Approaches to Socialist Integration, 
in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the US, East 
European Economic Assessment-Part2. Washington, DC, 
Government Printing Office 1981. 
Hannigan, J.B. and McMillan, C.M., The Energy Factor in Soviet- 
East European Relations, Research Report No. 18, Institute 
of Soviet and East European Studies, Ottawa, 1981. 
Haefele, W., Energy in a Finite World, Report written by McDonald, 
A., IIASA, Laxenburg, 1981. 
Hewett, E.A., The Impact of the World Economic Crisis on Intra- 
CMEA Trade, in E. Neuberger and L. Tyson, The Impact of 
International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, Pergamon Press, New York, 1980. 
hoffman, G.W., Energy Projections - Oil, Natural Gas and Coal in 
the USSR and Eastern Europe, Energy Policy, Vol. 7, No.3, 
1979. 
Iakushin, A., Sotrudnichestro Stron SEV v Toplivno-Energetichoskom 
Kompleke, Voprosy Ekonomik, No. 6, 1979. 
Kozlov, I.D., Energoticheskoe Khozieistvo Stron SEV: Problemy i 
Perspektivy Sotrudnichestra, Moskva, Nanka 1980. 
National Foreign Assessment Center: The World Oil Market in the 
Years Ahead, ER-79-10327U, 1979. 
National Foreign Assessment Centre: Energy Supplies in Eastern 
Europe, ER 79-10624, 1979. 
OECD, Committee for Energy Policy, Energy Resources and Trade of 
the USSR and Eastern Europe, Paris, 1980. 
Oechisper, .R.G., and Martens, J.A., Eastern European Trade with 
OPEC, in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the US, ,East 
European Economic Assessment, Washington, DC, Government 
Printing Office, 1981. 
Pekshev, In.A., Dolgosrochnye Tselevye Progrommy Sotrudnichestva 
Stran Chlenov SEV, Moskva, Nanka 1980. 
Scanlan, T., CMEA Oil Demand Balance to 1980, in NATO-Economic 
Directorate, CbEA: - nergy 1980-1 990, 1981. 
Stern, J.P., Western Forecasts of Soviet and East European Energy 
and the Next Two Decades (1980-2000) in Joint Economic 
Committee, Congress of the US, Energy in Soviet Policy, 
Washington, 1 98 1 . 
Sassin, W., On Energy and Economic Development, IIASA, Laxenburg, 
1981. 
Vanous, J., Eastern European and Soviet Fuel Trade 1970-1985, in 
Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the US, East European 
Economic Assessment, Part 2, Washington 1981. 
